CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY	USSR	REPORT			
SUBJECT	Soviet Views on Coexistence and	DATE DISTR.	MAR 23 1955		
	the Inevitability of War	NO. OF PAGES	2	•	
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THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.

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(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

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- 1. In general, the Soviet people believe that war is inevitable. There has been so much propaganda devoted to this subject since the 1930's that the idea is fixed firmly in everyone's mind. The Soviet people do not necessarily expect war to be imminent, but are certain that a war will come. The majority of the people are probably doubtful as to the outcome of a war with the capitalist powers. At the time of the German attack, the people, while doubtful, nevertheless felt that the Soviet Union would be victorious. With the signing of the alliance with the Western powers in 1942, the doubts disappeared and the majority of the people were convinced of victory.
- 2. While convinced that war is inevitable, the Soviet people do not want a war. They had felt that there was some justification for the integration of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia into the Soviet Union because they had once been part of the Russian Empire. The Soviet people cannot see any justification for taking over Eastern Europe, however, and laugh at Soviet propaganda which claims areas in countries such as ... Iran as legitimate parts of the USSR. In addition, the Soviet people are not fooled by talk about "liberation" since they well know what it is to be "liberated" by Soviet power.
- 3. Coexistence is taught in schools as a viable concept. Although it is stressed that capitalism is doomed and Communism is the wave of the future, students are told that coexistence between the two worlds is possible. If a question arises over this evident contradiction, the lecturer destroys the doubts by the omnipresent dialectic method, confusing the questioner, the class, and probably himself. In Party schools, however, the truth is clearly put forth. These schools teach that coexistence is merely a temporary tactic of the Communist movement to be utilized until the Soviet bloc is strong enough to launch the

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	inevitable war which will lead to the complete victory of Communism in the world. Within these Party schools "top secret" books are used and in these books this concept, the real truth of the matter and not what is taught to the public is explained. Before World Mar II the	25 X 1					
	existence in schools, only of the inevitability of war. Stalin expound the concept of coexistence a lot of nonsense. "How could these two opposing worlds coexist?" Discussion among Party colleagues and students in Party schools made it clear that this was a temporary tactic.	25X1					
4.		25 X 1					
	although the present leaders do not particularly want war, they are really	25X1					
	present position of power. The combination of this desire and the desire to spread Communism will make war inevitable when the Soviet that their position is rapidly weakening.	25 X 1					
5.	the following aspects of Soviet strategy are proof that the Soviet leaders think in terms of an inevitable war:	25X1 25X1					
	a. The constant increase in defense expenditure.	20/(1					
	b. The continual strengthening of heavy industry at the expense of consumer goods and a rise in the standard of living.						
	c. The struggle to increase the production of grain for bread supplies.						
	d. The use of armed force to keep East Germany and the Soviet Zone of Austria in Soviet hands.						
	e. The refusal to reach any agreement on the German and Austrian questions.						
	f. The categorical refusal to agree on any plan for disarmament or atomic energy control. Even if the Soviets ever do agree on these two points at an international conference, it will be a surface agreement only.						
	g. Speeches such as Molotov's recent one attempt to intimidate the West on the question of atomic energy and Soviet strength. This false position as to relative strength is one that they will continue to maintain before the world in an attempt to impress not only the Western powers but also the satellite countries and the neutrals.						
6.	union, notably in the professional groups, who feel that the development of the	25X1					
	time this type of person is weak in relation to those who really run the country-the Party activists. The Party activists predominately and fervently maintain the opposing concept of world conquest. So long as the Soviet Union's economic and world position is strong there will be no opportunity for the more moderate concepts to rise. In the event of a weakening of the Soviet Union's position, however, there are two possibilities. They may turn to war immediately as the answer to their insoluble problem, or more moderate views might prevail and change the ideological position in respect to the problem.						
	conquest.	25 X 1					

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